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C I P T E R I.
0-
INTRODUCTORY
OL/
"The great wisdom and policy of the sges and found-
ers of our law have provided4 that no possibility, right,
title nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned
to strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiply-
ing contentions arxi suits, of great oppression of the
people, and chiefly of terre-tenants, and the subversion
of the due and equal execution of justice."
These are thL words of Lord Coke in his great opin-
ion delivered in Lampet's Oase (10 Co. 47 a). They con-
tain the reasons of one of the greatest of Englisbi judges
for the existence of the rule at common law which prohib-
ited the assignment of any possibility, right, title or
thing in action. This rule was absolute. No matter
how valuable the possibility or interest might be; no
matter how certain and definite the event upon the hap-
pening or non-happening of which such possibility would
becorc& Ir esent and vested; no i atter how formal the pro-
ceeding or how strictly the instrument of intended trans-
2fer was phrased; if the subject was not in actal or po-
tential existence at the time of the grant or assignment,
he who attempted to enforce his claim found himself per-
fectly powerless in a court of law.
There seems to be some chance for dmfference of o-
pinion respecting the reasonfdng for the strict adherence
to this rule. The origin of this rIle was attributed
by Coke to the "wisdom and policy of the sages and found-
ers of our law", to discourage maintenare and litiga-
tion. This seems broadly reasonable and extremely plaus
ible. Uhdoubtedly an unrestricted power of assigning
future interests amd expectancies, might give rise to
ni ay secret as well as annoying transactions which would
be entered into for the satisfactions of private animos-
ities or for the satisfaction of some unprincipled desire
for gain. Such a power might, indeed, be the "occasion
of the multiplying of contentions and suits, of great op-
pression of the people, and chiefly of terre-tenants and
the subversion of the due and equal execution of justice'"
As a result, a just and discriminating public policy
would demand that this power would be withheld, or at
least, curtailed to an extent that would deprive the ex-
3ercise of that power of its ievil consequences. It is
thus readily observed that Lord Coke bases the reasons
for his opinion in Lampet's Case squarely on the broad
principles of public policy anduniversal justice as those
principles were discovered and applied by the sages and
founders of English law.
It has already been stated that there is opportuni-
ty for difference of opinion in regard to the scientific
basis of this common law rule against the unrestricted a
assignment of choses in action. Happily for the evolu-
tion and development of Anglo Saxon law and jurisprudence
no opportunity for difference of opinion, in the wide
and widening fields of -h w and equity, hD s been left un-
seized by the judicial m d controversial minds of Eng-
land and Anerica. Consequently criticisms of the reason
given by Lord Coke for the existence of this rigid com-
mon law rule are and lengthy. It ifas been argued
with much plausibility that this rule was the log.ical
outcome of the primitive notion of a contract as being
purely Personal and originating no liability o~tside of
the larties immediately included in its terms. (Pollock'
Prin. of Con., p. 202) . The primitive notion of a con-
tract! WTence comes this "primitive view of a crntract"?
Was the contract created firsand then folloied by the
creation of man whose legal nature was so cnnstructed as
to blend harmoniously with the nature of the crntract?
Did the contract spring full grown from the brow of jus-
tice, or was the essential nature of the contract arn ev-
lution from the slow centuries of social existence? Which
is first the m.an or the contract? It would seem that
neuessity pr-ecedes principle. The natureof man and the
necessities of the socilal structure areLhe prime forces
which in the play and inter play of their resle .ctive ten-
d-encies evolve a public, social policy of utilitarian
justice. Public policy 6s an evolution. It is the i
trusty pilot that guides the mind of the judge through
the intricacies of present necessity and past principle
and practice, so that, while he g]ides clear of abso-
lute individualism on the one h nd, he also avoids on the
other, the equally dangerous tendency of absorption of t
the individual in the state. That is, expressing the
same idea in another way, public policy rrotects each pa
ticular individual, but never a particular indiividual
at the expense of society as a whole. Nothing lives
5that goes against public mforals. iNothing long continues
th t i I-ilitates against sound public law. iNothing
survives that contervenes public justice. These are all
but parts of a great public policy. It is evident, thee
fore, that every jirnciple, every custom, every law,
which serves to knit society morn closely together and
which tends to produce the greatest good to the greatest
number, is but a child of public policy. A contract is
one of the many progeny. It never had nor has it now,
any of the inherent qualities nor virtues of its own. It
has always looked and still continues to look, to public
policy forits interpretrtion, force and effect. Let
public policy once demanrd it and the entire nature of the
contract would be changed as soon as a test case could
receive fina-l adjudication in the courts of justice.
In view of all this it is sacevhat difficult for the or-
dinary individual to perceive just how M.r. Pollock is to
be justified in his criticism of Lord Cokse regarding the
foundation of the common law rule against the assignment
of choses in action. At best, it is but calling atten-
tion from the great principle to one of its apiplications.
This may be clarifying and useful, but it should hardly
6be made the occasion of an attack on merit. Lord Coke
attributes the existence crf the rule to broad public
policy; Mr. Pollock, to (ine phase of public policy. A
ship fo'nder in mid-ocean during a heavy sea; Lord Coke
holds that the destruztion of the vessel is caused by
the sea; JIr- Pollock contends that it is caused by the
waves. Observe the difference.
C HAFPTRR TI.
0-
ASSIGNMENTS OF CHOSES IN ACTION AT THE
CO MMOIN LAW
The subjects of property are divided into two class-
es, things in possession and things not in possession.
Things not in possession may be subdivided into those
things of which tlere is the right of present possession
and those concerning which there is a mere right of fu-
ture possession. Now the common law had no means or
methods of dealing completely with the second of these
classes. That is to say, the only ownership which the
common law completely recognized was the ownership accom-
panied by possession. But where the ownership and the
possession were severed the only right which the common
law recognized was the right to recover possession. In
other words the right of the real owner was simply a law
suit-- a chose in action.
It has already been shown in a way how seriously the
commnon law objected to the transfer of choses in act ion.
Where there was a present right to the future acquisi-
tion of property, the commn law was st ill more at fault,
for there was not even a right to recover the goods but
only a right to t!ecover darcrages for their non-delivery.
When we seek the reason for this rule we find it in the
motive already mentioned- an apprehension that justice
would fail and oppression would follow if possibilities,
titles, rights of action, etc. might be assigned. "Noth-
ingt" says Lord Coke, "Nothing in action, entry, or re-
entrr, can be granted over; for so, under color thereof,
pretended titles might be granted to great men, whereby
right might be trodden down and t he weak oppressed".
(Co. Lit. 114 a). The modern writer is willing to admi
indeed, is even very anxious to p.oint out, how feeble,
partial and corrupt must have been the administration of
justice where such reasons could exercise such a decis-
ive force. le desires to impress (inefaceably)upon the
mind oT the student who is anxious to obtain a broad and
scientific comprehension of the gradual evolution of law,
just the iYnner in which early justice was administered,
together with such a perfect idea of the problems and
conditions with which jurists were compelled to grapple
as' will soften a too severe condenation of the devious
course which justice was forced to follow. 1 is only
by recurrence to history that we cantrace the true rea-
sons of the English law. It is only by a just and sympa-
thetic interpretation of historical conditiona and phenoffi
ena that we are able fully to appreciate the virtues of
external systems which are now practically obsolete, or
venerate sufficientlj: themen whose genius coneeived an-
whose power sustaine7 t hem. We must, in order to ascer-
tain the sense and extent of their systems and doctrines,
bear in mind the state of society which produced them,
the evils for which they -were intended to afford a reme-
dy, and the different state of things to which theyr are
now applicable. In early times there we reasons why
there was such a horror of maintenance; there were chang-
es in the nature of nan and of his view of society be-
fore this horror was dissirated;, there w ere good, dor,_nd,
solid, practical reasons vohy things in action were not
vendible. If those reasons have ceised -to exist and
time has given a more p afect conception of the relations
of debtor : nd creditor, it is not :Jo much du~e Lo our own
inherent superiority as it is to the fact that those men
/
of old builded just the best they knew with the~rude ma-
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terials at hand.
Besides, however, the horror of irainbenanece and
chapperty which animated the breasts of the early Eng
lish judges, there was another reason which helped to
form the logicil basis of this rule. In he eye of the
law there could be no valid sale unless the thing to be
sold was in rerum natura, an"nder the immediate control
of the vendor. The Lw regarded it as absurd that an
attempt should be made to accomplish a sale when the
thing to be sold was not in the actial ownership of the
seller. Consequently it prevented such sales by falling
back upcn the rude common-sense notion that if you had
not a thing you could not sell it.
But whether these reasons were good or bad the
fact temains: the con-non law rule that possibilities or
choses in action were not assignable was well nigh abso-
lute. Only two excertions were countenanced by the
courts. The King could always either grant or receive
a possibility or chose in action by assign-ent without
such ransaction receiving the condemlnation of the court.
Co Litt. 232 b n. 1;
Coin. Dig. (Assigninentl D. 555;
Miiles v. Williams, 1 Pr- Wis. 252;
Stafford v. Buckley , 2 Vesey 177-181;
3 Peters (U. . ) 12.
11
'rhe other exception which crept half scared into the dm
cisions of the common law judges because of the eculiar
nature of the subject matter of the transfer, w:-s the
case of annuities. TIey might be as.igned with compara-
tive freedom. Gerard v. L-oden (hetl. 80). No doubt
this exception of annuities from the operation of the
law was thorpughly illogical; but it was perhaps felt
that it would be noticeably burdensom:e if this verty com-
mon species of personal estate should not enjoy the same
privileges of alienability which were possessed by per-
sonalty in possession. Anyhow the exception is well es-
tablished.
Choses in action not being assignable at law it
followed that the person to whom they were assigned could
not at law sue in his own name. Indeed, he right od a&
tion is an essential part of the assignrnent as viewed by
the law. It must be remembered that in early English
history the protection of the poor against the oppress ion
of the rich, the debtor against the exactions of the cre
it or, was one of the great occasions which called for ju-
dicial interference, especially on the part of the Chan-
cellor. Could we in any wise logically separate the
12
right of action from the assignrent proper, we readily
perceive how futile it would be to prohibit the act it-
self and still when that act was accomplished, enrich
the wrong doer with the fruits of his illegal effort.
This, the early jurist plainly foresaw, wo 1d change
the sword of the enemy from his left hand to his right,
thus endangering the security of private prope~rty ar the
liberty of the individual.
13
C H A P T E R III.
THE ATTITUDE OF EQUITY TOWARD THE ASSIGNd
MENT OF CITOSES IN ACTION.
From a very early date courtsr f equity viewed as-
kance the common law principle which prohibited almost
unqualfiedly the assignment of things in action. That
system which Lord Coke considered the "Perfect ion of hu-
rran wisdom", the court of chancery regarded as semi-bar-
barous or, to say the least, narrow and absurd. "Acting
upon the principle that a man ray bind himself to do any-
thing which is not impossible, and that he ought to per-
form his obligations when not illegal, equity has alwayFs
held that the assignmnent of a thing in action for a valu-
able consideration ought to be enforced; and Irs also
given effect to assignments of every kind of fUture and
contingent interest and possibility in real or personal
property when rude upon a valuable consideration."
I Ves. Sr- 331; 2 Eq. L. C. 1531; 1 Ves. Sr. 409-
411; 1 Pr. Will. 3r/-381; I Ch. Rep. 29; 1 Ch. Cas.
4-8; 2 Atk. 417-421; 33 IT .. J. Nq. 614; 91 Pa. St.
96. 3 Met. 121; but see L. R. 8 Eq. 69 ; 2 Story
Rep. 630; 35 Cal. 378; 45 Mvo. 106; 3 Robt.(V. Y.
104; 41 Vt. 533; L igelo~i on Estoplel 331.
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In the civil law and in the jurisprudence of the modern
commercial nations of Continental Europe -here does not
seem to be any foundation for an objection against the
assignment of debts. They seem to lave been assigned
in the most flourishing of the conmercial countries of
Europe arxi for the most part suit could be broughtin the
name of the assignee.
Pothier on Sales (by Cushing) n. 550, 55-55'd;
Troplong des privil. et hypoth. torn. I. n. 340-343;
Civil Code of France, Art. 212;
In the code of Jl:stinian the same attitude is manifest:
"Nomdnis autem venditio et ignorqnte, vel invito eo, ad-
versus quem actiones mandantur, contrahi sol-et." (Code
Lib. 8, tit. 42, 1.). It is also a matter of common knowl
edge that bills of exchange were trasnferable or assign-
able at a very early date; and an assignelient wo ld have
fl-ll effect in transferring the title even though made
without the knowledge and agsinst the will of the debtor.
(1 Doi-at. L. 4, Secs. 3 and 4). Slight and infrequent
exceptions might be round to this Teneral rule s for ex-
ample, where the liws of a part icular and isolated courn-
try especially prohibited it, or hwere, ias in certain in-
stances, it was not drawn with all the due f~rrn-iti s
andi requisites of the eustomary bill of exchange. Even
in these exceptions the courts did not reject them from
15
a sense of outraged for,, but rather from a sense of pos-
sible, if not probable, d:.nger. Long experience had
taught that only an instrument in the precise stereotyped
form could be used in transferring debts without loss to
some innocent party; and any variation from that form
would give imediate notice of an opportunity for fraud.
Equity, ni'ore liberal in its views, and less trammelN
led in the administration of justice, followed in the
footsteps of progress and heeded the voice of necessity.
As before stated, from a very early period _1ssignments
which found no place in the narrow justice of the law
found response for their necessity in the liber al heart
of equity. The Irrinciples upon which equity carried
those assignnents into effect were precisely the same as
those upon which they enforced the p.erformance of an agre
nrnt when not contrary to their own rules o .. public pol-
icy.(ireem. Ch. Rep. 145; 1 Pr. Will. 381). "Such an as-
sigrnment", observes Lord Hardwicke, "always operates by
way of agreement o- contract, amounting, in the consider-
ation of the court, to this, that one agrees with anoth-
er to transfer or ruake good rha . right or interest,
(Wriht . Wigh, IVes. Sr. 412), arid like any other
any other agreement, the coitrt will cause it to b.e spe-
cific di plerformed ( not leaving the assignee to is ac-
tion for danages) where the assignor is in a condition
to transfer the property, or to cause it to be transfer-
red to his as:ignee." It was but a natural consequence
then, t iat the assignee of an ordinary thing in 7ction,
,-s a debt issuing out of a contract relation, acquired
an immediate equitable ownership therein -o far as it is
possible to predicate property or ownership of a sTecies
of right; and the assignee of can expectancy, possibility,
or contingency acquired the right of exercising control
over thhe proceeds as fast as they cae into actual exist-
ence on the ground that the expectancy or contingency
had been transformed into present interest in possessin
ion. (10 H. of L. 191) Eqity stretched its hand a-
cross the interval of tine and upheld the right of the
assignee until he was ready to receive it in use. The
absolute possessorV right was held in abeyance by the
very nature of the thing assigned until the equitable
ownership should ripaZ into he s bsolute right of pos-
sessionsa arid enjoymrent on th, happening of the ant icipa-
t ed event•
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It has already been observed that the assignee of a
chose in action could not sue in his own name. But it is
the settled rule in all the states where ehoses in ,ction
are allowed to be assigned that the assignee can be sued
in his own name. If the thing in action is itself le-
gal the assignee obtains a legal interest as a result of
the assignnent . The equitable rule that an assignee cn
sue in his own name does not in any way enlarge the list
of assignable things; it simply applies to things in actt
tion which, tested by other principles and rules, are as-
signable; and if they are of such a legal character that
at law the assignee would be permitted to sue in the as-
signor's narre then the interest of the assignor is le-
gal. (63 N. Y. 8), 50 Ind. 319; 38 Wis. 542). It must
be strictly observed that if a thing in action is a claim
purely equitable in its nature, or if it is one which the
courts of equity alone recognize-as for example, an
order given upon a particular fund or an ass ignrent of
part of a single demand- then the ass ignor's interest
is still equitable. (Pomeroy' s Eq. Jur., Vol. III. p.
285 ).
As to the things in action which are or are not as-
18
signable. The following rule is given by Mr. Pormeroy"
"All tiing, in action which survive and pass to the p-er-
sonal repre:Dentatives of a decedent creditor as assetts,
all continue as liabilities against the representatives
of a decedent debtor, are in general thus assignable;
all which do not thus survive but lie with the pirson oft
the debtor or creditor, are n ot assignable. The first
of these classes, according to the doctrine prevailing
throughout the United States, includes all claims aris-
ing from contract express or implied, with certain well
defined exceptions; and those arising from torts to real
or personal property, and from frauds, deceits, and oth-
er wrongs, whereby an estate, real or personal, is injurd
ed, diminished or damacred. The second class embraces
all torts to the person or character where the injury and
daLage are confined to the bodyand. thefeeling; aiil also
those contracts, often implied, the breach of which pro-
duces only direct injury and damage, bodily of mental,
to a person, such as promises to rmarry, injuries done by
the want of skill of a medical practitioner, contrary to
his implied undertaking, and the like; '::nd .. lso those
contracts, so long as they are executory, which stipu-
19
lte solely for the special persoml services, skill or
knowledge of a contracting party". (Por. Eq. Jur- Vo .
III. Sec. 1275 and cases cited).
We th.s see that large classes of things in action
m.y be assigned both at law or in equity. But there (are
ian  assignments :,r-ich are prohibited by the law as a-
gainst public policy. .,ny assignraent f a chose in ac-
tion ;wihich violates the law of charmpert. and.- maintenance,
as operating merely to encourage litigation, are held
void both at law and in equity. In England a person
cannot assign his salary or other emolunent for past or
future service to the country which is r&rrarded as hono-
rary or which dignifies the person by labelling him as a
quasi-public individual. (T. and R. 459; L. R 7 Ch.
109). It is probable that in the United States any pub-
lic officer would ba 1.llowed to assign his official sal-
ary provided no statute expressly or impliedly prohibit-
ed it. Still the following have been held to be not as-
signable:- the salary , not yet due, of a public office
(BeaJe v. MdcVicken, 8 Mo. App ;202);Claims againstthe
United States in some cases; in Becker v. Sweetzer (15
Minn. 327) defendant retained the plaintiff in aiding
20
him to collect a claim due him from the United States
for services rendered to certain Indians of the:,, Sioux
tribe for tie payment of which claims the United States
had already nrade provision; and for the ascertainment and
paynent rf such suns defendant was to pay plaintiff one
fifth, and for that consideration tssigna and transfer
to the plaintiff an equal and undivided one fifth par to
of said clims; this assignment was held void by the cout
courts (Wanless v. U. S., 6 Ct. of Cl. 123; Danklesson
v. Braynard, 3 Daly 183; St Paul R. R. v. U. . 112 U. S.
733; a presumption of right, Whitney v. Buckman, 13 Cal
536; a bare right to file a bill in equity, Dayton v.
Fargo, 45 Mich. 153; a mere right of action for a tort,
f;ardner v. Adairs, 12 Wend. 297; Dickinson v. Seaver, 44
Mich? 624; Linton v. -fervey, 104 Mass. 353.). It is al-
so held, "tilat an order drawn on a frind for only a part
thereof does not amount. to an assignment of that part,
f'r tie reason that a creditor shall not be prermitted to
split up a single cause of action itto many actions with.
out the assent of the debtor. In other words-----
a part only of a chose in action cannot >e assigned1 1 with-
out the consent of the debtor. (Bispham's Prin. of Eq.
21
p. 219 and cases cited). But in Indiana sich an assign-
ment nay be sustained for certain persons. In Lapping
v. Duffy (47 Ind. 51), part of a judgrrent was assigned,
and the court in considering the question observed "We
think it does not follow that there rmust be diverse ac-
tions, if' the cssignent of part of the judgment is rec-
ognized as valid. The several parties owning the judg-
ment may unite in an action upon it". But the court
does not decide this point as the judgment was given on
the ground that the judgement debtor and the defenlant
Duffy assented to the assignrrnt of la rt of the judgment
to the plaintiff. It is the 2;%ener~l rule that a mu-
nieipality is not bound to recognize such a partial as-
signmrent of a contract to which it is a party. (Phil.
App. 8'3 Pa. St. I9). The lien of a vendor for purchase
money is not assignable (Richards v. Learning, 27 Ill.
431). Nor can a contract founded in a personal confi-
dence and trust, (Landon v. McCarthy, 45 Mio. 106); nor a
r ght of entry for a condition broken (Mcviahon v. Allen,
34 Barb. 56); nor the right to cancel usurious contracts
by action (Bouton v. Smith, 26 Barb. 635, but see~ Spicer
v. Jarrett, 58 Tenn. 454).
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In the procedure of many of the states of the Union
principles both of law amd of equity are applied by the
same court; so that the assignee, whether his remedy be
at law or in equity, presents his claim to the same tri-
bunal. Moreover, it is generally decided in this coun-
try tht a legal assignment of a legal thing in action
cnnfers only E legal interest and the assignee can sue in
his own nake only by a civil action which is essentially
legal in its character. Even where the thing in action
assigned is equitable, or such as the courts of law would
not formally recognize, still the assignee must sue in
his own name; and where there are no principles peculiar
to equity to be .:pplied his procedure and remedy would be
to .ll intents and purposes legal. But if the recovery
depended on the application of purely equitable doctrine
the equitable juriddiction of the court would be invoked
and the procedure and remedy would be equitable in nature
We have thus far noticed the salient points of dif-
ference between the attitude of law and equity towards
the assignments of choses in action. Thus far the dis-
cussion has been generol. It ires been shown how the
early common law absolutely refused to recognize the as-
signnent of a chose in action or anything not in esse"
23"
We have next to consider particularly the attitude of
equity toward some other assigrments which the 1aw re-
fused to recognize, but especially of asignrents of D
fund.
CHAPTER IV.
T0-
WHAT COULD LiE ASSIGNED IN EQUITY tH1OUGH NOT AT LAW.
"A Tarty may purchase the whole interest of another
in a contract or security or other property which is in
litigation, provided there be nothing in the contract
that savors of maintenance". That is, provided he does
not attempt to pay any costs nor make any other advances
ielond the i.ere support of !he exclusive interest which
he alleges to have nequired. (Williams v. Prolheroe, 5
Bing. 309; Grill v. Levy, 16 C. B. n. s. 73). It is pep
fectly clear that a person ma-y assign the equitable in-
terest which arises under a contract for the conveyance
of real property. A person claiming under such an orig-
inal contract may sell or otherwise assign the equitable
interest so accruing to him under the transaction; and he
stands in equity in the position of a trustee for all
those persons who are p urchasers from him of his equita-
ble interest. Moreover it has been held in numerous
cases that "Equity not anly allows but actually compels
him to Ipermit the sub-purchasers to use his namre in all
25
proceedings for obtaining the benefit of their contract."
(Deaver v. Elleru, 7 Ired. Eq. 24; Dibble v. Scott, 5
Jones's Eq. 164). Such proceedings would have been
deemed shocking by the conservative and unalterable
judges of the conrnon law. In the same manner, if there
should be a trust estate in land either actual or con
structive, w-ich however is denidd by the trustee, still
the cestui que trust may assign his allegeddinterest and
the assignee may in equity enforce his right to the in-
terest under the trust.(Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sunner 475).
In Hartley v. Russell( 2 Sim. & Stu. R. 244,(, a creditor
who had instituted proceedings at law and in equity a-
gainst his debtor, entered into an agreerent with said
debtor whereby the creditor ,vas to relinquish certain
securities which he held of the debtor providing the de
debtor-would give him a lien upon other securities in
the hands of another creditbr; The debtor was to give
the creditor authority to institute proceedings against
such other creditor and aid him in all ways to collect
from the securities. In equity it was held that the a-
greement was valid 2nd not maintenance. Th ese illus-
trations are suffic ient to show how far the courts of eq-
26
uity Will-.go in carrying out assignments which in law
would be wholly disregarded.
A mere expectancy, as that of an heir at le to the
estate of his ancestor, could be assigned in equity.
(Hobson v. Trevor, 2 Pr. Will. 191; Wethered v. Wethered,
2 Sim. 183-192; Steele v. FreeborI 3 S. W. (tenn) 649;
but see Alves v. Schlessinger, 81 Ky. 290). A person
might assign a "-e. vy or a share of a residue. The in-
terest which one might take under the will of a person
then living (Beckley v. Newland, 2 Pr. Will. 182); or the
sl are to which a person may become entitled under an ap-
pointment (musprat v. Gordon, 1 Anst. 34) or in the per-
sonal estate as presumptive next of kin of a person then
living (hinde v. Blake, 3 Beau. 235); all these are as-
signable in equity for a ualuable consideration and
when the expectancy has fallen into possession the as-
signrent will be enforced. The assignment of future
freights, of future patent rights, of the profits aris-
ing from ths working of patents by a licensee, of future
dividends upon proof in bankruptcy, of the future cargo
of a ship, of building material to be brought on the
premises or machinery at a future time to be added to or
substituted for existing nachinery, of goods ani chat-
27
tels now being or which shall hereafter be in or about a
messuage or house, i. enforceable in equity. (Robinson
v. McDonld, 5 M.1an. & Sal. 228; Brown v. Tanner, 3 L. R.
Ch. App. 597; Printing do. v. Sampson, 19 L. F. Eq. 462;
Bergnam v. McMillan, 17 Ch. Div. 423; In re Irving, 17
Ch. Div. 419; In re Ship Ware, 8 Price, 269; Brown v.
Bateman 2 1. R. C. P. 272; Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 . of
L. 191; Ex Part'7 Games, 12 Ch. Div. 314). Of course a
contract to trnasfer property not in existence cannot op-
erate ,:s a present alienation, because there is nothing
at the time which can be subject to the mandate of the
court; but as soon as the subjeat of the transfer ma-
teri-lizes, or immediately upon its ,-cquisition, the as-
signor h ids for the assignee, whose title to the chose
is perfect and cannot be disturbed by execution creditors
of the assignor. (Pierce V. .R. Co., 24 Wis. 551; Pen-
nock v. Coe, 23 How. 117; ,orril v. Moyes, 56 -e. 465;
Beall v. .:',hite, 4 Otto, 387). In the Matter of the San-
key Brook Coal Co. (9 L. R. Eq. 721), the (irectors at-
tempted to mot'tga-;e or charge the plant .nd property in-
cluding_ all the personalty, in order to secure the repay-
rrent of money borrowed for various rurposes. It was
2(9
held that the proceeds of a call already made but not
yet paid might be charged, but not -he proueeds of fu-
ture call. In this country it is well established thit
mortgages on per:sonal property to be acquired in the futu
ture are valid in equity; Zas are also assignments of fu-
tunie acquisitions, mortgages given by railroads on rollig
ing stock and other -rersonal property.(Jones on Mort.
Secs. 153, 154, *52; Collin's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 590;
Sitters v. Lester, 48 lis;. 513; Walker v. Vaughn, 33
Conn. 577; Galveston R. R. Co. v. Coudry, 11 Wall. 459;
Smithurst v. Edmunds, 14 Ii. J. Equ. 438). A contract
made by bridge commissioners of a county to pay a cer-
tain sum of money for a bridge subscribed therein and for
the Prection thereof uponthe completion of such bridge
as fast as th.e money is collected byr the tax collector,
is assignable.(Smith v. ilubbard, 2 W. I. (Tenn.) 569).
A mechanic's lien, although inchoate, is assignable,
(McDonald v. KIelloy, 14 T. 1. 35). So is an att-rney(s
lien for services on a judgemnt. (Sibley v. Pine Co.,
31 in. 201).
From these examples and illustrations rmany of which
are given in the note appended to the case of Ryall v.
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Rowles, in Vol. of White & Tudor's Leading Cases in Equip
will serve to show in part what assignments were valid
in equity which :Tere held void at the cormon law- The
reported cases and the resulting illustrations under
them are legion, and only a bare outline of the most imp
portant principles can be given in a work of necessarily
so small compass. I have examined a large number of the
cross references and there number and ramifications are
so large and bewildering that the hope of a somewhat
thorough and orderly discussion of two or three of the
leading cases on each primKciple and exception has been
abandone d.
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C I A P T E RV.
VJI-AT AL UITS ~TO AN EQUI'IIABLE ASSIGIT"-1GE1,7
N o certain or particular form of words is neces,;ary
in order to make a valid equL.. able assignment of a chose
in action. (Rowe v. 'awson, 1 Yes. Sr. 331;
Spier, 13 Sire. 4'9; Tingle v. Fisher, 20 W. V.a 497; E.
Lewisburg v. Marsh, 10 Norris 100; Duck v. Swazly, 36
Me. 41; Conway v. Cutting, 51 K. i. 407). The English
and American rules are practically the same, the mrnor
differences being due to differences tn circ'-mstances and
condition, and not in principle. ',he great English case
s to what constitutes an equitable assignrent is that of
Row v. Dawson (sui-ra 1. In that case it appeared that
one Gibson had lent money to p-arties under whom the de-
fendnat cla imed and !,ave tkem -n order on Swinburne, the
deputy of Horace Y1alpole, who was an officer of the ex-
chequer, for the payrent out of the monies due to him
from YUalpole out of the Exchequer, of 400 pou.nds to one
person, and200 ppunds to the other', "value received".
The question was wheth~or these persons were entitled to
be classed as equitable assignees of the monies due from
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the exchequer to the est-lte of Gibson, ho having become
a bankrupt. It was held th.t the order amounted to an
equitable assignment of the funds. The case followed
Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield (1 Ch. Rep. 29) and was follow
ed by Ryall v. Rowles ( 1 Ves. Sr. 348,), and Bryce v.
Banister (3 Q. B. D. 569) decided in 1878. These case:s
uniformly lay dovn the rule that no partieular words are.
necessary to create an assignn-ent of a chose in action
or a fund -that there must be a clear intention to
make the assignrrent tltt the fund or property must be
specificall , pointed out- and that there must be an ab-
solute appropriation of the r.'roperty which is the sub-
ject matter of the transaction- In other words, the ev-
ident principle to be deduced from the cases is that an
agreement between a debtor and a creditor that a debt ow-
ing shall be paid out of a specific fund comirg to the
debtor and such acts accompany the agreement or follow
it as indicate an appropriation of the fund to the assign
ee, or an order given by a debtor to his creiitor upon a
third person having funds of the debtor, to pay the cred-
itor out of such funds, will create a binding equitable
assignixent of so much money. (Benjamin on Sales, pp. 62-
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67; Bryce v. Banister , supra;). In the decisive case
of Ex parte Alderson(l L.,add. 53) wiere the same question
arose, Sir Thons Plunmer ]J. R. nade the following obser-
vation:- "Is this draft to be considered in equity as an
assignrrent of the debt, -hich is a chose in action? And
did not tihe executor bind himself to pay it? I think it
was a good equitable assignment" since the property had
been specifically pointed out and alpropriated tthl-n-
tent to charge. The intention to create a charge must
always be shown. Thus a mere authority to a person to
draw to the extent of a specified amount, as , for exam-
ple, a mere letter of instruction to a banke-r not written
with any intent to create a charge on a fund in his handq
will not amount to an equitable assignment of the fund.
(Hopkinson v. Forster (19 L. R. Eq. 74). Nor is a
check an equitable assirnment of the drawer's balance at
the bankers upon whom it is drawn.(Hopkinson v. Forster.
supra).
With practicall,' all the principles thus laid down
by the English courts the law of this country is in uni-
son as the following examination willshiow.
What is necessary to constitute a valid equitabl-e
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assignment has been well expressed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Case of Christm u's v. Russell
(14 Wall. 69) The Court, spenaking through Mr. Justice
Swayne, says- "An agreement to py out of a particular
fund, owever clear in its terms, is not an equitable as-
signment; a covenant in the most solemi form has no
greater effect. The phraseology employed is not materi-
al providing the intent to transfer is manifested. Such
an intent and its execution are indispensable." To make
an equitable assignment, there must be such an appropri-
ation of the subject nmatter as to confer a complete and
present right on the pi.arties intended to be provided for,
even where the circumstances do not admit of its imredi-
ate exercise. In the Case of Dickinson v. Phillips(l
Barb. 454) the defendant being indebted to the plaintiff
gave him security on a schooner, agreeing at the same
time that he would procure an insurance on the uessel and
transmit the policy to the creditor. He subsequently
insured t-he schooner in the narre of G, a third party, and
informed plaintiff that he had done so and that G would
hold the insurance subject to the order of the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding these statements and allegations the
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court refused to recognize the transaction as an equita-
bel assignment. Ilarr is, J., deliverirvr the opinion of
the court said:--"It is true that no T-rticular form of
words is necessary to constitute an equitable assi-2nmert •
But there mrst at least be evidence of an intention to
appropriate the fund)" It seems that the acts of the
defendant tere not sufficient in the judgment of the
court to make the transactionan equitable assignment.
However, where a purchaser agrees to insure for the bene-
fit of his vendor and to assign the policy for his secu-
rity, and he subsequently procures the building to be in-
sured, but does not assign the policy to the vendor, the
agreenent operqtes as an equitable asa grmn-t of the mon-
ey payable upon the policy, in case of loss, but not as
an assignrent of the policy.(Cromwell v. Insurance Co,
39 Larb. 227).
Tie question as to what is sufficient to constitute
an equitable assignment of a fund was quite thoroughly da
discussed in Lank of Coimmerce v. Bogy (44 Llo. 13). phe
court said,-"A bill drawn upon a debtor does not of it~
self operate as an assirgnment in equity of the debt, ev-
en if it is negotiated for a good consideration." And
o5
Kimball v. Donald(20 Mo. 517) state3 the rule thus: Any-
thing which shows the intention on the nne side to make
a present irrevocable transfer of the fund, and from
which an c&nent to receive it can be inferred from the
other, wil operate in equity as an assignment, if sup-
ported by sufficient consideration". (ess il v. Alne-
t is, 56 Barb. 362; Noyes v. Brown, 33 Vt. 431; Arpin v.
Lurch, 32 N. W. 681; Gage v. Dow, 59 I. H. 383; Bower v.
Bluestone Co., 30 L. J. Eq. 171). But in Georgia, where
the thing assigned is a chose in act ion, the assig nment
nst be in writing (Insurance Co. v. Walrar, 30 Fed.
1,ep. 653).
Upon this examination of a few of the earlier lead-
ing cases on what constitutes an equitable assignment,
we begin to perceive what it is that equity requires be-
fore it will take cognizance of an alleged -,ssignment.
In the first place there must be a clear intent, either
express or implied, to apropriate the fund. It is the
first maxim of the law as well as of equity that great
diligence and care must always be observed in order to
give force and effect to the intent of the parties, if
that intent is not illegal or the carrying out of the n-
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tent does not contravene public rpolicy. If the court
c~rnot find in the transaction itself an intent to appro-
priate the fund it will never manufacture such an intent.
T1e reason for this is found in the very nature of equi-
ty itself. Equitable principles exist to give justice
to litigants; and this never can be done by manufactur-
ing intent or by giving false interpretation to t~'iose al-
ready existing. Another reason why equity requires a
clear intent to apropriate is found in the f'wt that the
doctrine of equitable assignments is entirely foreign and
contrary to the early common law. It is a primitive
doctrine of the law that no action on contract can be
maintained in a court of law except among parties between
w.,om there is a privity of' contract relation. No doubt
this extremely technical rule has been softened consider-
ably by contact with the more elastic principles of eq-
uity; so that at the present time in most of the states
an action can be maintained by, A. upon a promise made
for his benefit to B. even though A. id not privy to
the consideration. But this is opposed to the original
principles of the common law as is shown by the greaL
controversy which has arisen concerning one phase of the
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subject exemplified in the New York case of Lawrence v.
Fox(20 I'qw York 2 i); and equity, before modifying the
common law, always requii'es good and sufficient reasons
shown. One of tiae most important of these reasons is a
clear unequivoc.l intent . (Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y.
454).
Another pre-requisite to a valid equitable assign-
mont A f a fu-nd is its absolute appropriation. So long
as the debtor exercises control over the fund the tran-
saction is equivocal because his retaining control over
it is legally inconsistent with the purpose to which the
creditor alleges it to have been dedicated. A valid
equitable assignment transfers an ownership to equitable
Iroperty. The righi transfe-rred is more than an equita-
ble lion or charge. It as an equitable property and own-
ership. But owinership implies absolute and unqu alified
cont:.rol by the assignee of the thing assigned or its
proceeds, Therefore when the alleged assignot retains
control over the fund he exercises the prerogatives of
ownership; that is to say, he exercises a dominion over
the property inconsistent with the dominion of any otherz
person. Hquity takes him at his word, or rather his
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act, and irfuses to recognize any other ownership by con-
str'uing the transaction into an equitable assignment
It has, therefore, been uniformly adjudged in this coun-
try th at the transfer of" the fund to the control of the
assignee must be absolute.
One of the earliest New York cases in substantiation
of this position is Rogers v. Hosack's Executore (18
Wend. 319). Here one, Gracie, had covenanted with the
plaintiffs to p'ay them the balance of their debt with
certan French funds when he should receive them. This
was held by the court not to be an equitable assignment
of the fuid. It seems plain that had Graeie survived
the treaty by which the French funds were to be obtained,
the i.!aintiffs might have sued him at law for not paying
their share as per contract. fhis would have been their
only remdy. There was no assigrnment, no mortgage, no
pledge, no order, or any othe specific appropriation of
the French fund, but a re re covenant to lay them on their
being received by the covenantor. Such an agreement
does not create any lien either at law or in equity.
(In re Holmes, 2 Rose's Cas. in Bankr. 355; Williams v.
Everett, 14 East, 582; Clayton v. Fawcett, 2 Leigh, 19;
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Brainard v. Burton, 5 Term Rep. 97). In the early case
of Mandeville v. Welcb (5 Wheat. 27/), decided in 1820,
tho Uni-led SLates Supreme court speakin7 through Justice
Story, b .id down the principle in a similar manner. There
the court laid down the doctrine that where an order is
dr wn either on r generul or particular fund the apj-ro-
priation must be absolute and unequivocal. This dec isin
ion was followed in 1831 by the court in Shanckland v.
Washington (5 Peters 389), and also in Tiernon v. Jackson
(b Peters 580. In the latter case there was an assign-
ment of a cargo of tobacco, made while the tobacco was (,n
its way to the consignees for sale, by indorsen-ent on a
duplicate of the invoice, andwhich directed the consign-
ee to ay a specified sum from the proceeds of their sales
to the persons named, who were creditors of the consign
or. It was here held that, under the ciircumstarres,
the indorsement was not sufficient to give a payee named
in the assignment a right of action against the consign-
ee for a pntion of the proceeds of (he sales as money
received to his use. rThe assignment did not purport to
be (a. here is the importart point) an absolute trans-
fer of all the interest of the assignor in thetobacco, so
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as to divest him of control over its ranagerment arni put
it inmnediately at the risk of the assignee. The rties
evidently contemplated a sale to be made by the co nsigne,
aid the assignemat was not of the tobacclo itself immedi-
ately, but a portion of the fund to arise from its sale
at a future period. It did not pass nor purport to pass
the legal title in the tobacco or its proceeds, but mere-
ly created an equitable interest in the proceeds after
sale, for the benefit of the assignees.
In New York the case of Roger v. Hosack's Executors
(supra) and Dickinson v. Phillips(supra) have beenuni-
formly followed in holding that no equitable assignment
of a fhind or other prope'rty would be recognized as such
by a court unless there had been an unqualified appropri-
ation of the prop rty br the assignee. This appropria-
tion may be evinced in many ways. The most usual way
is th t of an unrestricted delivery of the order to the
assignee or payee. T is is clearly stated by Judge Ra-
pallo in Brill v. Tuttle (81 N. Y. 454). The following
is his language:'-"There can be no doubt as to the rule
that when, for a valuable consideration from the payee,
an ordler is drawn upon a third prty and made payable out
of a particular fund, then due or to becomne due from him
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to the d awer, the delivery of the order to the Iayee op-
erates as an assiFnrent protant o of the fund, and the
dry'wee is bound, after rnotice of such ass ignrint , to ap-
ply the fund as it accrues, to the payment of the order
and to no other purpose ".
T-e case of Brill v. Tutiujtle (supra) is a leading
case in Now York on the equitable assignment of a find
add the principles therein enunciated deserve further at-
tentton. rThese are the eacts: A. and Co. who ware re-
pairing a house for the defendant for a valuable consid-
eration, executed and delivered an order to the plain-
tiff, directed to defe ndant, asking him to 1pay plaintiff
a certain sumn due the plaintiff from A. and Co. for ma-
terials furnished. The work .vas ne;,rly done when the
order was executed. It was held that the order did not
necessardly require a construction holding that it was a
request to -ay in advarce the sum specified; that the di-
rection therein, in connection with the surrounding cir-
cumstarc es, indicated tle intent to have been simply to
direct p ayment of such sums as were or might become due
to the drawers on the account for irepairs, up to the a-
mount sp:ecified. "It is equally wiell established" said
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the court, " that if a draft be drawn generally upon the
drawee, to be paid by him in the first insta e, on -he
credit of the drawer and without regard to the source
from which the money used for its Fayrent is obtained,thi
desigination by the drawer of a particular fund out of
which the drawee is to reimburse himself for such paymnt
or a particular accounf to which it is to be charged, wi
will not convert the draft into a consignment of the fun4
and the payee of the draft can have no action thereon a-
gainst the drawee unless he duly accepts. In all cases
therefore in which a particular fund, to accrue in futuro
is designated in the draft, and the language is ambigu-
ous, the turning point is whether it was the intention of
the parties that the payrmnt should be make only out of
the designated fund, xhen or vhere it should accrue, or
whether the direction to the draw ee to pay was intended
to be absolute and the fund was _nientioned only as a
means of reimbursement, or an instruction :- s to book-
keeping." If it was the intention of the parties that
the payment should be made only out of the designated
fund, when or where it shou ld accrue, ii, would be an eq-
uitable assignment pro-tanto of the fund; but if it was
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t ~eir intention that the ray~ent should be absolute, nd
thle fund. V.-as ment ioned only as a source oi' re-ijnbur,.emefnt
it ,ould not be an equii able assignment of such fund.
Son- authorities contend tl-t Brill v. Tuttle does
bot follo-,w; the cae ses of Belly v. Mayor(4 Hill, 263) and
'haver v. Telegraph Co.(57 N. Y. 459). In the former
case the Mayor drew a negotiable draft on the tre aurer
of the city: "Pay to A. L. or order, $1500 award number
7, and chargetto Bedford road a,3sessment." This was
held to be not &on eq'itable asd gnnnt; but it is a'very
different case from that of Brill v. Tuttle. The first
loint of difference is thant Kel!y v. Mayot was not tIhe
case of an order drawn by a creditor on a debtor and 1-Y-
able to a third person. It was vroved also, that the
treasurer, at the time, :had no funds in his hands arising
from the Bedford Road assessment. Moreover, the evi-
dent intention of' the Mayor was not so much that it
should be payable out of a particu ,.- r fund, as that it
shouldbe regarded merely as instruction for the uid ance
of the treasurer to make plain the resp)ective acecounts of
the city dertment. The instrument, therefore, retain-
ed its character as a negotiable bill Zf exchange.
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A comparison of Brill v. Tuttle with Shaffer v. Tel-
egraph ;o. discloses even greater discrepancies than we
were observed in the comparisons just imade. There the
defendant wrote B, an employe that if he would make an
order on the treasurer of the defendant ('f the defendant
for n iart of his salary to be paid to a third per-
son, the sum named by B. would be paid monthly until B.
revoked the order-. B. took advantage of the offer order-
ing a monthly sum to be paid to plaintiff. The order
and letter was delivered to N. for a valuable considera-
tion, who flied thiem with the cashier. B. subsequently
wrote the treasurer saying that "if not accepted" he
countermanded the order- Action was brought to recover
the sums which defendnat refused to pay pl intiff. In
contradistinction o the case of Brill v. Tuttle we ob-
serve t'hatthe order was given by B. in pursuance of a
previous arrangement with the d~fendant whereby B. the
drawer, could revoke the order at any time. It is ex-
ceedingly clear that this assignment or appropriation is
not absolute. rjhe drawer does not relinquish his do-
miniorn~and control over the fund. The order which B.
drew actually gave notice to the drawee that it was not
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to be understood as an ubsolute assignment of the sum
that should become payable :t the eni of' each month, but
that it ,vas always subject to the reserved right f B.
to revoke it. An-:, person taking the order tcok it sub-
ject to this rirlit. B. exercised that right according
to the conditions of the order .!,-d no complaint could be
made to the action :,s the agreement canta6ned on its face
the very stipulations of which B. took advanta,_ .
In Lowery v. Steward (25 N. Y. 239), a letter to the
consignee of cotton by the consignor stating that he had
drawn on the consignee for 500 payable to a third peso
when thre cotton should be .old, was held to be such a
specific ppropriation of the fund to accrue in futuro
as would amount to an equitable assignment of the sane.
This case follows and sustains Hall v. City of Buffalo
(1 Keyes, 193). In this case a contractor to whom the
city of Buffalo was largely indebted, drew orders upon th
the comptroller of the city, who, according to the estab-
lished usage of the city, received noticess of the claims
against the city by third parties, in favor of divers:
parties upon the fu~nd eld for the payment of such cl'_ ms
The or'ders'were held to be equivalent o san equivalent
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to an equitable assignmxent pro tanto of the funds in the
treasury of the city. (Peyton v. Hallet, iCaines, 363;
Martin v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Field v. Moyor of New Yor4
2 Seld. 179; Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill, 417; Harris v. Clark,
3 Comst. 93). The question in Parker v. City of Syra-
cuse(31 K. Y. 375) presents the same pro lem and deals
with it in the san-e way. In Alger v. Scott(54 N. Y*
14), an order was drawn by a landlord -pon his tenant in
August, 1866:- "Pay to J. . G. 346 and charge the se
to me, ace unt of rent of house 13 Cheever Place". Nor
rent was due at the time. The tenant accepted the order
but did not pay it at onee. Th landlord began an ac-
tion for the rent in November, 1866. Defendant rut in
the order from the landlord and his acceptance of the
same as a defence. The court held it not a. good de-
fence because there was no consideration for the equit;-
ble assignment and it was therefore void and the land-
lord could recover. (Ehrich v. DeMill, 7b N. Y. 370
Munger v. Shannon, l N. Y. 251; Risley v. Smith, 64 N.
Y. 576; Gibson v. Lenane, 94 N. Y. 183; Conselyea v.
B~nchard, 103 N. Y. 222; Lanejr v. Dun, 115 N. Y. 405;
Fairbanks v. Sargent, 11l7 N. Y. 32 0).
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It is well settled that no action at lawcan be main-
tained by the payee against the drawee on sn unaccepted
oeck. (Bank v. Schuuler, 120 U. S. 511; Bank v. Millard,
10 Wall. 152; Calrm v. Eank, 107 1AMass. 45; Sayles v. Busn1-
ong, 100 Pa. S 23; Bank v. Bank, 69 d 23 ) But
there has been considerabLe di-pute at various times as
to whether c r not a check or draft drawn upon a fund more
than sufficient to pay it operates as an equitable as-
signment of the amount f'or which the check is drawn, as
between the drawer and the payee. The Circuit Caurt of
the United States has thrown the weight of its authority
in the affirmative. -i the case of the German Saving
Inst. v. AdaeChief' Judge McCrary said: "1ere is cer-
tainly no good grovindfor hold ing that a check or draft,
drawn upon a fund in bank, is not an equitable assign-
ment as between the drawer and he payee; ani in a case
,where there is no controversy as to the riahts of the
b.nk or drawee, it does not lie in the mouth of the draw-
er or his assignee, to say that such can instrument is
n~ot an equitable as . ghnt". The same rule is held in
the following cases: Roberts v Austin(26 Iowa, 315);
Munn v. But.ch (25 Ill. 65); Bank v. Patton(l0a Ill. 4i9);
Bank v. Bank (114 Ill. 4-&i) . This point howyever has not
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been ipassed upon by the United States Supreme Court.
(Bank v. Schuler, 120 U. S. 514). But thi.; is entirely
contrary to the doctrine as established in T.e;Yovk and
in England. In Atty General v. Ins. Co. (71 I. Y. 325),
Church, C. J., spoke as follows: "The doctrine (that
cleck is not an equit ble assignment) accords with the
relations between the parties. A check is a request of
a customer to pnay the wiole or a portion of such indebt-
edness to the beared or to the order of the It yee. Un-
til presented and accepted it is inchoate; it vests no
title or interest, legal or equitable, in the payee to
the fund. Before acceptance the drawer may withdraw his
deposit; the bank owes no duty to the holder of a check
until it is presented for payment. Knowledge that check
lve been drawn does not make it obligatory, on the bank
to retain the deposit to meet them. These rule s are
indispensable to the safe transaction of comercial busi-
ness. Any other rule would produce confusion, andin-
volve banking institutions and all depositories of mon-
ies in responsibility to conflicting claimants, which,
while producing great embarassments, would serve no ben-
eficial purpoee. (Bank v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82; Tyler v.
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Gould, 48 N. Y. 682). The Englsih co1Yrte -re in 'inison
with t.hose of New York. (Hopkinson v. Forster, L. . 19
Eq. 74).
We have thu',s far discussed the two conditions ,iiich
must concur before ;fl equitable ass ignment of the fund
can be made. The:; are the intention of the tarties, ad
th1e absolute apropriation of the subject matter- There
is practical unanimity among the courts both of the Uni-
ted States.3 and Englend in lying down tle p:,rinciple; but
in attempting t( arrive at just what acts constitute an
appropriation, they sometimes differ. It can be general-
ly stated that the answer to the question, at whose risk
do the goods rein. in,solves the problem, Thie only dif-
fici)1t- encQintered is in answering the question. It de-
pends almost entirely "pon the facts and circmstanes of
each particular case. rio be sure, illustrations can be
given so broad tlt we can say unhesitatingly that such
a state of facts could not possibly amount to an equit -
ble assignment; or circumstcnes could be detailed so
clearly within the rule that we could declare as confi-
dently that this state of facts must inevitably consti-
tute an equitable ass i~nment. But between these two ex-
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tre, mes lie practically all the cases that are ever liti-
gated; and with reference to al these, each controver-
sy, while being governed by the principles l.1ready lb. id
down, must of necessity be decided largely if' not entir*
ly wit. h reference to its own peculiar circumstarnes and
conditions.
CHA PT R VI.
0-
NOTICE - EQUITIES.
It is a familiar doctrine that whenever a debtor
makes to his creditor an equitable assigrnent of a spe-
cific fund or debt in the hands of or owing by a debtor,
the assent of such third person is not necessary to the
validity of the assignment; andyet the assignment is not
absolute and is subject to revocation by the assignor at
any time before the assignee has beet notified of the
transaction and, either expressly or impliedly, manifest-
ed his assent. (Scott v. Porcher, 3 Meriv. 652; Gar-
radd v. Lauderdale, 2 Russ. & M. 451). This is but an
illustration of the simple rule that a complete contract-
requires an acceptance, as well as an offer, and requires
no citation of authorities for its support.
It is also a familiar doctrine that to render the
: sdgnment perfect and valid as against the assignor him-
self that is, to give the assi'nee a claim upon the
fund and a right of act ion to secure it-- no notice of
the assignment need be given to the debtor or other per-
son holding thefund. It is not quite so certain whether
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sucl1 a statement can be made with respect to those who
are rebh ted to the assignor as judgment creditors and
rere volunteers unde- him. It has been so held, howiev-
er, by eminent English courts. (Beavan v. Lord Oxford,
6 D. G. ,M. & G. 492; Kinderly v. Jervis, 22 Beav. 1).
But when we turn from the ansideration f the relations
between the assignor :,nd the ass. gnee, to a view of
those subsisting between the assignee and the debtor- or
the holder of the fund or subsequent assirnees, it is at
once evident that the reasons which control in the former
case do not exist in connection with the latter. So it
is firmly established that, as against dubsequent assign-
ees for a valid consideration, a notice to the debtor,
trustee, or holder of a fund, is necessary in order to
perfect the assigrnnent and render it valid and effectual.
Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure, is the well known
maxim of the 1w regarding the position of litigants in
courts of ]a w as to their respective rights in the same
property. This rule always contrls where, by the first
contract, all the thing is given; for then there is noth-
ing to be the subject of the second contract and priority
must decid'e. But there -ire certain conditions under
5,3
which this legal maxim cannot be implied. For exsxnple
the rile is not to be resorted to when the question does
not lie between bare and equal equities. In all cases
of equ itable assignments the legal title isoutstanding;
and of such circumstances it can not be contended that
priority of time is decisive, because the equities
rmr not be at Il equal. "If at any time there appears
to bein respect t(.circujnstances irndependent of prioti-
ty of tirx , a better title in the subsequent purchaser
to call for the legal estate than in thepurchaser who
precedes him in date, the case cease s to be a b.;lance
of equal equities, and the preference, which priority
of date might otherwise have given, is done awa with r-nd
counteracted". (Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ, 1) . It may be
contended that notice is not a necessary requisite to tb
conveyance of an equitable interest. It is true that
if one wishes to rely ( n the c ntract merely, he does not
need to give notice; for from the moment of the consum-
mation of the transaction the assignor is personalLy
bound. But if it is desired, asit almost inevitably is,
to attach one's right upo.n the thing itself, notice must
be given. "If you omit to give that notice you are
54
guilty of the same degree and species of neglect as he
who leaves a personal clattel to which he has acquired a
title, in the actual possession andunder the absolute
control of another person". If the chattel is conveyed
to an innocent third person fro value, the real owner is
estppped from attempting a recovery. Giving notice is
regarded as equivalent, or atleast analagous to the act
of taking possession.
It should be carefully obeserved, however, that to
enable a subsequent assignee to obtain a priority in
this nmanner , by giving the first notice to the debtor or
legal holder, he must be an assignee in good faith and
for a valuable consideration. This is the English rule
and has been adop ted in this countrj.
In the case of Tallman v. Hoyt (89 N. Y. 537) it wjs
held that a valuable consideration was an essential ele-
mnt of an equitable asignrrent (Stone v. Frost, 61 N. Y.
614) -
The asa gnee of a chose in action, whether it be a
debt or an obligation, or a trust fund althou h , ithout
notice, in general takes it; subject to all the equities
which subsist against it. In the .leading case of Bush
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v. Lathrop (22 I. Y. 535), a mortgane was transferred by
a subsequent as.ignee thereof, by an instrument absolute
on its face, but was taken in fact as security for a
m uch smaller sum than that due upon the mortgage, and
the second assignee transferred it for full value to a
third person without notice. It was held that equi-
ties existing between the assignor and assignees of a
chose in action not negotiable, attend the title trans-
ferred to a subsequent assignee for value and without no-
tice. The latter takes the exact position of his vend-
or. (Beebe v. Bank, 1 Johns. 529; James v. Murray, 2 Cow.
246; Covdll v. Bank, 1 Paige, 131; Muir v. Schenck, 3
Hill, 28; Poillon v. Martin, I Sand. Ch. 569; Sweet v.
Van Wyck, 3 Barb. Ch. 647). Chief Justice Ruger lays
down the same rule in Fairb-nlcs v. Sargent (104 N. Y.
108), citing Bush v. Lathrop (supra) with marked approval
(Litchfield v. Bank, 97 N. Y. 581; Cowdrey v. Vandenburg,
100 U. S. 572). The reason of this rule is very evi-
dent: The holder of a chose in action cannot alienate
anything but the beneficial interest he possesses. It is
the question, f powet and capacity lo transfer to anoth-
er and that capacity &s to be exactly measured by his own
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rights. (Greene v. Warwick, 64 N. Y. 2 20; Union Col-%.. 1e, 1IT*. Y, 88)
lege v. Whetler, 1.
As we biave already seen t!- notice sho ld be given
to the debtor, trusyee, or other holder of the fund, eit+-
er in writing or verbally; but if the notice is verbal it
must be explicit, defitite, and certain. (In re Tichener
35 Beat. 317; Brown v. Savage, 4 Drew, 635). The rule as
to notice does no, - ly to negotiable instrldnents not to
assignnents of equitable interests in ladd, but applies
only to pe,rsnal property debts, money claims arising
from the contract, funds and the like. (Glyn v. Hood,
I De. G. F. & J. 334; Jones v. Jones, 8 Sir(, 633).
It is ageneral principle irr-espctive of any re-
qu1irement to give notice in order to obtain priotity,
that the duty rests upon all assignees of things in actin
to use reasonable diligence in Ierfecting their titles or
in enforcing their rights. An assignee may -lose prior-
ity throught his laches as against a subsequent rurcl-ser
inrgood faith and for value, who has been injured by the
negligence. It is a qeneral rule tlit the assignee
should take all :.teps permitted by Ia which ?re equiva-
lent to actual possess ion
